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This paper uses the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF) to examine whether the low 
take-up rate for publicly provided health insurance is caused by welfare stigma that people 
associate with those programs.  The NSAF asks several questions related to welfare stigma, 
including whether respondents believe that welfare makes people work less, or whether welfare 
helps people get back "on their feet."  If stigma plays a role in take-up, then among eligible 
patients, those who neglect to enroll in Medicaid will have more negative attitudes towards 
welfare, all else equal.  As a second approach, we test the predictions of a Moffitt (1983) utility 
function, with fixed and variable stigma from public benefits.  In the end, we believe we can 
demonstrate that stigma plays a large and statistically significant role in deterring Medicaid take-
up, but we cannot distinguish responses to Medicaid benefits (which should have no variable 
stigma) from responses to Food Stamps (which should have large variable stigma).  Finally, the 
results of this research, while of academic interest in their own right, also have substantial policy 
implications.  If low Medicaid take-up is caused by welfare stigma, the policy prescription is 
much different than if low take-up is caused by paperwork hassles, lack of information, or 
perceived low quality of care.   
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Many Americans fail to receive public benefits to which they are entitled, and Medicaid 
has among the lowest take-up rates (Remler and Glied, 2003).  There are two common 
explanations for low participation.  First, the transaction costs associated with public benefits 
such as cash assistance, Food Stamps, and Medicaid may be too large for some people to 
overcome.  These costs can include gathering information, filling out paperwork, or finding 
transportation.  An alternative explanation is that some form of social stigma deters participation 
in public assistance programs. This paper uses data from the National Survey of America's 
Families to measure the extent to which stigma reduces Medicaid participation. 
Differentiating between the two explanations for low take-up (transactions costs and 
stigma) is important, because public policies designed to reduce one effect may exacerbate the 
other.  For example, if the chief obstacle to participation is transactions costs, then an obvious 
policy solution would be combining the paperwork and infrastructure for as many public 
assistance programs as possible, so-called "one-stop shopping."  However, if the participation 
obstacle is stigma, then the Medicaid infrastructure should be separated from other public 
assistance, so as to avoid the stigma associated with those programs.  One-stop shopping would 
only worsen this problem.  Differentiating stigma and transactions costs as causes of low take-up 
rates is thus critical to increasing Medicaid enrollment.
1 
 
1 Currie (2004) points out that some states have separated their State Children's Health Insurance 
Programs (SCHIP) from regular Medicaid, specifically to avoid collective stigma, while other states have 
pooled the programs to reduce administrative costs.  
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Finding the cause of under-participation in Medicaid is also important because it affects 
people's health.  While it is true that patients can enroll in Medicaid retroactively if they become 
sick or need care, uninsured patients tend to delay seeking care, use less preventive services, 
experience more adverse health outcomes, and are four times as likely as insured patients to 
require both avoidable hospitalizations and emergency hospital care (ACP-ASIM, 2000).   
Recently, a small amount of work has been done on stigma and Medicaid take-up rates.  
Remler and Glied (2003) survey this literature and conclude that there is little evidence that 
stigma adversely affects take-up.  However, they note that most of the surveyed studies use 
proxies for stigma that are difficult to interpret, and this may explain the weak results.   
Stuber et al. (2000) interview 1400 community health center patients nationwide.  They 
find that 50 percent of patients reported some type of stigma associated with Medicaid 
participation.  Furthermore, people's reported stigma dropped by half for those who applied for 
Medicaid in a place other than the welfare office, suggesting that the stigma attached to 
Medicaid participation may be derived from the welfare stigma associated with cash assistance.  
However, the authors then estimate a multivariate analysis of the determinants of take-up.  Of the 
22 perceived problems with Medicaid that the authors include as controls (lack of information, 
perceived poor quality, stigma, etc.), only five are described as significant, none of which are 
directly related to stigma.
2   
 
2 It is not clear what controls aside from the 22 stigma variables were included (education, 
income, health status, etc.), and it is not clear by "significant" whether the authors mean statistically 
significant or large in magnitude.  (The results deemed insignificant are not reported.)  Moreover, with 22 
stigma-like variables, multicollinearity likely generates statistically insignificant results, though their 
combined magnitudes may be empirically meaningful.  
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Our approach differs from previous efforts to identify the role of stigma in several ways.  
First, we use the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF), a large national survey that 
oversamples poor households in 13 states.  The NSAF asks several questions related to welfare 
stigma, including participation in various programs, and whether respondents believe that 
working for pay is important, or whether welfare helps people get back "on their feet."  If stigma 
plays a role in take-up, then among eligible patients, those who neglect to enroll in Medicaid will 
have more negative attitudes towards welfare, all else equal.  The NSAF also asks about 
respondents' health, employment, and the quality of health care received.  Second, we use 
Moffitt's (1983) preference-based model of welfare stigma to consider how fixed and variable 
stigma might differently affect take-up rates for Medicaid and Food Stamps, and then look for 
support for that theory in the data.   
  By contrast to the existing work we have seen, our examination of the NSAF suggests 
that welfare stigma plays a statistically and economically significant role in deterring Medicaid 
take-up.  An eligible survey respondent who strongly agrees that welfare "makes people work 
less" is about 8 percent less likely to enroll than otherwise similar respondents who disagree with 
that statement. Similarly, eligible respondents who strongly disagree that welfare "encourages 
babies before marriage" are 8 percent more likely to enroll than respondents who agree.  
 
2. Examining the data. 
The NSAF is a part of the Urban Institute project titled Assessing the New Federalism.  It 
is representative of the national, noninstitutionalized, civilian population under age 65.  Though 
comparable in size to the Current Population Survey (CPS), the NSAF oversamples low-income  
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families and families in 13 states.  The first two rounds of the survey were carried out in 1997 
and 1999.   
Importantly for our purposes, the NSAF asked respondents to evaluate eight statements 














Welfare encourages young women to have babies before marriage. 
When children are young, mothers should not work outside the home. 
Welfare helps people get on their feet when facing difficult situations.  
A single mother can bring up a child as well as a married couple. 
People who want children ought to get married. 
Working for pay is one of the most important things a person can do. 
(Not asked in 1999.) 
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship 
with her children as a mother who does not work. 
Welfare makes people work less than they would if there wasn't a 
welfare system.  
 
Respondents selected one of four categorical responses to each statement: strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, and strongly disagree. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics from the pooled 1997 and 1999 NSAF 
surveys, limited to female-headed households earning less than 50 percent of the federal poverty 
line and who are therefore likely to be eligible for Medicaid.
3  Those respondents in the sample 
who are not enrolled in Medicaid are more likely to believe that welfare encourages out-of-
wedlock babies, and that mothers should not work.  These unenrolled respondents are less likely 
to believe that single parents are as effective, and that working mothers are as good, and are 
more likely to believe that welfare discourages working.
4  So among likely eligible NSAF 
 
3 Predicting Medicaid eligibility is difficult, and involves complex family considerations and state 
variation in eligibility rules.  Our simple criterion, 50 percent of the FPL, at least gets us comparable 
demographic groups.   
4 Note that we have ranked the categorical responses from 1 to 4, with higher numbers associated  
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respondents, those who enroll in Medicaid have less negative views of the welfare system.  This 
is at least consistent with welfare stigma deterring Medicaid participation. 
Table 1 also documents other differences between enrollees and those not enrolled in 
Medicaid.  The enrolled respondents are poorer, less healthy, more likely to participate in the 
Food Stamps program, and have more children.  They are less likely to be married, and are more 
likely to live in the Northeast or the Midwest.  To control for these other observable 
characteristics of respondents that may be correlated with their attitudes towards welfare and 
Medicaid participation, in Table 2 we estimate probit models of the likelihood of being enrolled 
as a function of observable demographics and other state characteristics. 
Table 2 presents probit estimates of the likelihood of being enrolled in Medicaid, 
conditional on the characteristics in Table 1.  In columns (1) through (7) we have included each 
attitude variable separately, in case multicollinearity renders them statistically insignificant 
together.
5  In column (8) they are all included simultaneously.  As it turns out, the pattern of 
signs and statistical significance of the attitude variables is identical in column (8) and the earlier 
models, though the magnitudes tend to be slightly larger when the attitude variables are included 
separately. 
The results in Table 2 reinforce the evidence from the simple differences of means in 
Table 1.  Respondents currently enrolled in Medicaid are less likely to agree with negative 
statements about welfare recipients than are otherwise-similar respondents who are not enrolled. 
 These include "welfare encourages babies before marriage," "mothers of young children should 
 
with stronger agreement with each statement.  (This is opposite to the ranking assigned by the NSAF.) 
 
5 The attitude variable "working for pay is important" was included in the 1997 NSAF, but not the 
1999, so we have excluded it from the analysis here.  Including it changes nothing about the results.  
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not work," and "welfare makes people work less."  And, respondents enrolled in Medicaid are 
more likely to agree with positive statements such as "single mothers are as effective as a 
married couple." 
Not only are the attitude variables statistically significant predictors of Medicaid 
participation, they are empirically significant.  For example, poor respondents who strongly 
agree that welfare makes people work less are 8 percent less likely to enroll than respondents 
who disagree (twice the marginal effect of 0.04 in column (8) of Table 2).  Similarly, 
respondents who strongly agree that welfare encourages out-of-wedlock births are 8 percent less 
likely to enroll than respondents who disagree. 
  These results stand in sharp contrast to the few studies to date, mostly based on small 
samples of individuals surveyed at medical clinics. These new findings that welfare stigma plays 
an important role in the low Medicaid take-up rates.  If public policies could ameliorate this 
stigma, perhaps by separating Medicaid enrollment paperwork from other public assistance 
paperwork, that might increase Medicaid participation, and ultimately the health of the eligible 
population. 
  While these results do suggest that stigma plays an important role in determining 
Medicaid participation, several cautions are worth raising.  First, we have interpreted "stigma" as 
the survey respondent's own attitudes towards welfare programs.  An alternative would be to 
consider stigma to be the attitudes of non-participants towards those who do participate.  We 
have explored this alternative by including in the table 2 regressions the state-wide average of 
the attitude variables for those respondents whose household incomes were above 50 percent of 
the poverty line.  However, none of these proxies for local attitudes were statistically significant.  
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  Second, because we have not precisely identified Medicaid eligibility, we cannot be 
certain about the direction of causality.  It may be, for example, that poor people who are for 
some reason deemed ineligible for Medicaid harbor ill feelings towards the program, while poor 
people who receive benefits do not.  Nevertheless, the fact that low-income, female-headed 
households with negative attitudes towards welfare are less likely to participate in Medicaid, 
even after controlling for observable household characteristics, leads us to believe that welfare 
stigma should be taken seriously as one of the causes of low Medicaid take-up rates. 
 
3.  A preference-based approach 
The approach in the previous section is based on reduced-form regressions of Medicaid 
participation on individual characteristics, including attitudes towards welfare.  It is based on no 
economic theory except for the simple idea that if people have negative attitudes towards 
welfare, they will be less likely to enroll in Medicaid even if they are eligible.  To push a little 
further on the analysis, we would like to test whether patterns of Medicaid participation are 
consistent with simple economic theory about stigma. 
Moffitt (1983) describes two types of stigma: a fixed stigma cost of receiving any 
benefits, and a variable stigma cost that increases with the size of the benefits.  He examines the 
effects of these costs using a utility function  
U=U(y + γPB) - φP  (1) 
where y is earned income, (1-γ) represents the variable stigma cost of participation,  P is an 
indicator for welfare participation, B is the size of benefits, and φ is the fixed stigma cost  
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incurred for any participation.  Variable stigma costs are decreasing in γ, and fixed stigma costs 
are increasing in φ.  Moffitt's utility function has two main empirical implications: 
(a)   If there is a fixed stigma (φ>0), then people will participate if and only if  
 
U(y+γB)-U(y)>φ  (2) 
 
and the participation rate will increase with the benefit, B. 
 
(b)  If there is no fixed stigma (φ=0), then people will participate if γ>0, and 
participation will be independent of the benefit, B. 
These two insights have important implications for Medicaid, which to a first 
approximation comes in a fixed quantity.  Either a person is covered by Medicaid, or not.  If two 
neighbors participate, one cannot have more benefits than the other.
6  Because there can be no 
variable stigma cost associated with Medicaid benefits, any stigma will automatically have an 
effect on participation, and participation will be a function of benefit generosity. 
Unfortunately, it turns out to be very difficult to assess the benefits of Medicaid 
participation.  Benefits differ across states, with some states supplementing Medicaid and other 
states not.  Benefits also differ across individuals, in the sense that Medicaid will be more 
valuable to a sickly person than to a healthy person.  
To capture the variation across states, in Table 2 we have included a simple count of the 
number of optional services states have added to Medicaid benefits.
7  These optional services 
 
6 If all participants have the same underlying health risk, then a priori they have the same benefit 
from enrolling in Medicaid, and any stigma associated with participation is fixed.  Once they become ill 
and see a doctor, there may be stigma costs associated with visiting Medicaid clinics, but those costs 
would be incurred after the enrollment decision has been made.  More subtle issues arise when patients 
have different health risks. 




include dental care, mental health care, prescription drugs, nursing facilities, etc.  Each 
additional benefit adds about 1.1 percent to the likelihood that eligible respondents participate in 
Medicaid, supporting the idea that Medicaid stigma comes in a fixed amount.  Of course, we 
cannot rule out that there may be fixed administrative costs associated with Medicaid 
participation, and that the increase in participation associated with additional benefits is due to 
respondents judging that the additional benefits make it worthwhile to incur those fixed 
administrative costs. 
To control for the heterogeneity of Medicaid benefits across individuals, we have 
included in table 2 a dummy variable for individuals with a "health disability that limits work."  
In column (9) we interact that health dummy with the number of additional Medicaid services 
offered by the respondent's state, with the idea being that less healthy respondents will place 
greater value on additional services.  All of these proxies for Medicaid benefits, the number of 
state services, the health of the respondent, and the interaction between those two variables, 
indicate that Medicaid participation increases with benefits, suggesting that a fixed stigma cost 
may be deterring take-up. 
By contrast, consider the Food Stamps program, where benefits range in size depending 
on the households' characteristics, and where recipients may feel stigma each time they use the 
benefits at a grocery store.  Larger benefits may be associated with larger stigma.  In other 
words, there may be a "variable" stigma associated with Food Stamps.  Imagine a Moffitt-style 
utility function with both Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits: 
     U=U(y + γFPFF + PMM) - φFPF - φMPM   (3)  
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where γF  is the variable stigma associated with Food Stamps, PF  is an indicator for participation 
in Food Stamps, F is the Food Stamp benefit, PM  is an indicator for participation in Medicaid, M 
is the size of the Medicaid benefit, φF  is the fixed stigma for Food Stamps, and  φM is the fixed 
stigma for Medicaid.  Note that there is no variable stigma of Medicaid (γM), by assumption. 
Assume further that there is no fixed stigma, φF, associated with Food Stamps.  Stamps 
can be sent in the mail, so that nobody can identify recipients until they go to the grocery store.
8  
In this case, the two Moffitt predictions apply directly to the two programs:  PM will increase 
with M, and PF will not increase with F.  This will be true even though both programs have 
stigma associated with them.
9 
From table 2, it seems that Medicaid participation rates (PM) are higher in states with 
larger benefits (M), as measured by the number of additional benefits provided in each state.  
This supports the notion that there is a fixed cost, which may be fixed stigma, associated with 
Medicaid.  We would like to pursue the analogous question and ask whether Food Stamp 
participation rates (PF) are higher for participants eligible for larger benefits (F).   
  To proceed, we need the dollar value of Food Stamp benefits, both for households that 
participate in Food Stamps, and for those that do not.  The NSAF data contain the dollar value of 
annual Food Stamps received by participants.
10  To predict the amount that would have been 
 
8Of course, there could still be fixed administrative costs. 
9This assumes that eligibility for and participation in the two programs are independent.  In fact, 
the two programs tend to serve the same populations, and county welfare offices that process Food Stamp 
participants steer applicants towards Medicaid.  Similarly, the fixed costs associated with visiting county 
welfare offices to enroll in Food Stamps may be indistinguishable from stigma-related fixed costs.  




                                                
received by nonparticipants, we use the participants' data and information about the Food Stamps 
formula.   
Benefits are determined by an administrative formula that depends on households’ size, 
cash income, shelter costs that vary by state of residence, child care costs, and assets.  Roughly 
speaking, the benefit is the difference between an annually adjusted monthly maximum benefit, 
which depends on family size, and the family's computed contribution to food. The family’s 
contribution is 30 percent of household income less deductions. 
We use this information to predict Food Stamp benefits for non-participants in two ways, 
presented in table 3.  First we regress the actual annual Food Stamp benefit received by 
participants on variables that are in the federal Food Stamp program formula, including family 
size, number of children and elderly household members, family earnings, car ownership, and 
marital status.  As an alternative approach, in column (2), we estimate the same regression using 
all of the arguably exogenous household characteristics, including race, education, and health, 
regardless of whether or not they are part of the Federal formula.
11 
  The next step is to predict Food Stamp program participation as a function of household 
characteristics including predicted household-specific benefits.  Table 4 estimates probit models 
of Food Stamp participation.  Column (1) uses the sample of female-headed households with 
incomes less that 100 percent of the poverty line, and uses the formula-based prediction of Food 
Stamp benefits from column (1) of Table 3.  The attitude variables have similar signs and 
interpretations as in the Medicaid participation regressions. Women who strongly agree that 
 
 
11 The sample used for predicting Food Stamp benefit is all households with family income less 
than 100 percent of the Federal poverty line. Of the 4061 households in the sample, only 310 received 
zero Food Stamp benefits.  To be sure there is not a left-censoring issue, we have estimated table 3 using 
a Tobit, with no significant changes in the results.   
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welfare encourages out-of-wedlock births are 1.8 percent less likely to participate in Food 
Stamps than women who disagree (twice the marginal effect).  Women who strongly agree that 
welfare discourages work are 3 percent less likely to participate in food stamps. 
  The key variable in table 4 is the predicted Food Stamp benefit.  The coefficient in 
column (1) (0.440) suggests that a 1000 dollar increase in annual Food Stamp benefits increases 
program participation by 4.5 percent. This is substantial, given that the mean Food Stamp benefit 
in the sample is around $1900, and implies that the elasticity of Food Stamp participation with 
respect to benefits is about 8.5 percent. 
Unfortunately, we have no good way of comparing our measure of the benefits elasticity 
of Food Stamps with the benefits elasticity of Medicaid, because our Medicaid benefits proxy is 
simply a count of the number of supplemental services in each state.  Qualitatively, however, it 
seems to us that the Medicaid benefit effect on participation in table 2 is not larger than the Food 
Stamp benefit effect in table 4.  For Medicaid, an increase of one supplemental benefit increases 
participation by about 1.1 percent, and the number of supplements ranges from 13 (Alabama) to 
33 (Wisconsin) with a median of 27 optional services.  For Food Stamps, a one standard 
deviation increase in benefits ($1700) would increase participation by 7.6 percent. 
  If there is zero fixed stigma for Food Stamps, and no fixed administrative costs, then we 
would predict that there would be no effect of benefit size on Food Stamp participation.  But we 
find that this is not the case. If there are fixed administrative costs, however, then participation in 
both Food Stamps and Medicaid will increase with benefits, and we have no means of 
differentiating the two types of stigma.  In the end, we are left with one of two explanations for 
our Food Stamps results.  We know from the attitude coefficients that stigma is associated with  
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lower Food Stamp participation.  From the benefits coefficient, we know that the stigma either 
has a fixed component, or that there are associated fixed administrative costs generating a similar 
effect. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
  Stigma seems to play an important role in deterring Medicaid program participation.  
Women who have low incomes and are heads of households, and who therefore are likely to be 
eligible for Medicaid, are significantly less likely to enroll in Medicaid if they have pejorative 
attitudes towards welfare in general.  The policy implications of this are straightforward.  States 
that combine multiple welfare programs under one umbrella, in an attempt to minimize logistical 
obstacles to enrollees, may be foiled by an increase in stigma if Medicaid suffers a loss in 
reputation as a consequence of association with other need-based assistance programs.  While we 
feel confident from this research that stigma is an important determinant of Medicaid take-up, we 
cannot say the degree to which that stigma is exacerbated by association with TANF or Food 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics from the 1997 and 1999 NSAF 
(Female headed household with income < 50 percent of the Federal poverty line) 
 
  All  Not enrolled in Medicaid  Enrolled in Medicaid 
   Mean  Std.err  Mean  Std.err  Mean  Std.err 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Attitude variables:             
   Welfare encourages babies  2.21  0.87  2.32*  0.86  2.15  0.86 
   Mothers should not work  2.59  0.81  2.63*  0.79  2.57  0.82 
   Welfare helps people get on feet  2.99  0.77  3.01  0.74  2.99  0.79 
   Single mothers are as effective  3.10  0.85  2.99*  0.87  3.16  0.84 
   People who want children should marry  2.71  0.82  2.73  0.78  2.69  0.84 
   Working for pay is important (1997)  3.38  0.61  3.37  0.63  3.38  0.59 
   Working mothers are as good  2.97  0.79  2.92*  0.78  3.00  0.80 
   Welfare makes people work less  2.73  0.89  2.83*  0.87  2.66  0.89 
Satisfied with medical care  1.70  0.83  1.81*  0.90  1.63  0.78 
Numbers of Medicaid optional services  24.62  5.62  22.91  5.96  25.70  5.11 
Family  earnings  1599.6 2405.6 2436.2*  2864.1 1076.1 1888.6 
Participate in Food Stamp program  0.96  0.20  0.87*  0.34  0.98  0.13 
Amount of Food Stamp benefit received  1932.0  1765.5  1024.2*  1601.3  2447.3  1642.9 
Number of children  2.50  1.41  2.31*  1.41  2.62  1.39 
Marital status (1=married)  0.13  0.34  0.22*  0.41  0.08  0.27 
With high school degree  0.47  0.50  0.47  0.50  0.48  0.50 
With some college education  0.11  0.32  0.10  0.33  0.12  0.33 
With college degree  0.04  0.19  0.05† 0.50 0.03 0.18 
Has health problem affecting work  0.21  0.41  0.16*  0.37  0.25  0.43 
Northeast 0.25  0.43  0.15*  0.36  0.31  0.46 
Midwest 0.19  0.39  0.13*  0.33  0.23  0.42 
South 0.38  0.48  0.53*  0.50  0.28  0.45 
West  0.18 0.39 0.19 0.40 0.17 0.38 
N 2559  985  1574 
Year = 1997  1317  448  869 
Year = 1999  1242  537  705 
* Difference of means (or proportions) between two groups is statistically significant at 5 percent. 
† Difference statistically significant at 10 percent. 
(a) Respondents choose from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 4 ("strongly agree"), so higher values correspond to greater agreement with 
the statement.  (This is a re-coding of the original NSAF scheme.) Table 2: Probit Estimates of the Likelihood of being Enrolled in Medicaid 
(Female headed households with income < 50 percent of the Federal poverty line) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Attitude variable                   
Welfare encourages babies 
 
-0.145*              -0.101*  -0.100* 
(0.032)         
           
            
            
         
           
          
          
            
            
   
            
            
             
              
               
                 
                   
           
                 
                   
                   
                   
      (0.034)   (0.034)
-[0.055]       -[0.038]   -[0.038]
Mothers should not work    -0.132*            -0.124*  -0.125* 
(0.035)     (0.037)   (0.037)
-[0.050]     -[0.047]   -[0.047]
Welfare helps people get on feet 
 
    -0.004          -0.011  -0.011 
  (0.035)     (0.035)   (0.035)
  -[0.002]     -[0.004]   -[0.004]
Single mothers are as effective        0.090*        0.088*  0.089* 
  (0.032)     (0.036)   (0.036)
  [0.034]     [0.033]   [0.033]
People who want children should marry          -0.019      0.041  0.042 
  (0.033)   (0.035)   (0.035)
  -[0.007]   [0.016]   [0.016]
Working mothers are as good            0.061†  0.0001  -0.00005
  (0.034)     (0.040) (0.040)
  [0.023]     [0.000] [0.000]
Welfare makes people work less 
 
            -0.121*  -0.102*  -0.103* 
  (0.031)   (0.033) (0.033)
  -[0.046]   -[0.039] -[0.039]
Number of optional Medicaid services 
 
0.028*  0.028* 0.027* 0.027* 0.027* 0.027* 0.028* 0.029* 0.026*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010]
Family earning per-capita  
 
-0.452*  -0.462*  -0.454*  -0.448* -0.455* -0.454* -0.456* -0.453* -0.454*
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
-[0.171] -[0.174] -[0.172] -[0.169] -[0.172] -[0.172] -[0.172] -[0.171] -[0.171]
Number of children  0.104*  0.108*  0.105*  0.105*  0.105*  0.107*  0.104*  0.106*  0.105* 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
[0.039] [0.041] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040]
(continued) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
                     
             
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Marital status (1 = married)  -0.634*  -0.631*  -0.657* -0.625* -0.652* -0.645* -0.647* -0.588* -0.585*
  (0.081)                 
                   
           
                 
                   
           
                 
                   
           
                   
                   
                  
                  
                  
                
                
           
                 
                   
                 
                   
                   
                 
                   
                   
                   
                   
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082)
-[0.248] -[0.246] -[0.256] -[0.244] -[0.255] -[0.252] -[0.253] -[0.229] -[0.229]
High school degree 
 
0.071*  0.077*  0.082*  0.079* 0.082* 0.080* 0.083* 0.067* 0.066*
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
[0.027] [0.029] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.025] [0.025]
Some college education 
 
0.077*  0.099*  0.080*  0.079* 0.081* 0.074* 0.084* 0.096* 0.095*
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092)
[0.029] [0.037] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.028] [0.031] [0.036] [0.035]
With a college degree  -0.042*  -0.024*  -0.047*  -0.036* -0.047* -0.044* -0.053* -0.017* -0.017*
(0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.148) (0.146) (0.147) (0.146) (0.148) (0.148)
-[0.016] -[0.009] -[0.018] -[0.014] -[0.018] -[0.017] -[0.020] -[0.006] -[0.007]
Health  disability [0.330] [0.352] [0.320] [0.331] [0.322] [0.322] [0.306] [0.352]
[0.069] [0.069] [0.068] [0.069] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.069]
[0.120] [0.127] [0.116] [0.120] [0.117] [0.117] [0.112] [0.127]
Number of options*health disability                  0.014* 
(0.003)
[0.005]
Per-capita GSP (000 $) 
 
0.039*  0.038*  0.034†  0.036* 0.033* 0.035* 0.037* 0.047* 0.047*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
[0.015] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.018] [0.018]
State unemployment rate (%) 
 
0.006  0.005  0.007  0.011  0.008  0.009  0.009  0.008  0.006 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Midwest
 
0.030 0.052 0.043 0.054 0.044 0.047 0.041 0.049 0.049
(0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)
[0.011] [0.020] [0.016] [0.020] [0.017] [0.018] [0.015] [0.018] [0.018]
South -0.345* -0.362* -0.379* -0.363* -0.377* -0.376* -0.353* -0.305* -0.306*
(0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134)




                     
     
(Table 2 continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
West -0.293*  -0.306* -0.278*  -0.287*   -0.303*   -0.297*   -0.306*   -0.258*   -0.257*
     
     
           
     
     
       
                   
(0.099)  (0.099) (0.099)  (0.099)   (0.099)   (0.099)   (0.099)   (0.100)   (0.100)
-[0.113]  -[0.118] -[0.107]  -[0.111]   -[0.117]   -[0.115]   -[0.118]   -[0.099]   -[0.099]
Year -0.168*  -0.146* -0.153*  -0.146*   -0.146*   -0.145* -0.151* -0.172* -0.172*
(0.033)  (0.032) (0.032)  (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.033)   (0.033)
-[0.063]  -[0.055] -[0.058]  -[0.055]   -[0.055]   -[0.055]   -[0.057]   -[0.065]   -[0.065]
Constant 15.646* 14.187*  12.975* 13.316*  13.366*   12.985*   14.011*   15.922*   15.994*
   (3.013)  (2.996)  (2.988)  (2.983)  (2.980)  (2.984)  (2.985)  (3.066)  (3.064) 
Pseudo-R2 0.160 0.158 0.154 0.156 0.154 0.155 0.159 0.167 0.167
Attitude  variables  (Chi-2)
 
              
                 
6.40* 6.40*
N 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559
* Statistically significant at 5 percent; † significant at 10 percent. 
(a) Respondents choose from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 4 ("strongly agree"), so higher values correspond to greater agreement with the statement. 
Standard errors in parentheses () and marginal effects in square brackets []. 
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Table 3:  Predicting Food Stamp Benefits 
Least squares estimates of the amount of Food Stamp benefit received 
(Sample: households with income < 100 percent of the Federal poverty line) 
(1)   (2) 
Family size  227.4*  Family size  263.7* 
 (33.9)    (40.6) 
Number of children  268.8*  Number of children  264.5* 
 (38.4)    (40.7) 
Number of elderly  -407.5*  Number of females  -4.8 
 (100.8)    (24.6) 
Family earning  -65.39* Family earnings  -61.1* 
 (4.68)   (5.8) 
Own a car  -309.5*  Own a car  -285.7* 
 (45.1)    (47.8) 
Female headed  89.2  Number of workers  -76.3
† 
 (78.8)    (41.4) 
Year =1999  -86.1*  Number of elderly  -371.3* 
 (42.9)    (104.7) 
Constant 1129*  Household  head:   
 (105)  Age  -1.0 
     (2.3) 
   Marital  status  42.0 
     (70.0) 
    Female household head  80.1
† 
     (85.6) 
          High school degree  66.02 
     (47.6) 
    Some college education  158.3* 
     (69.0) 
    With a college degree  56.2* 
     (113.7) 
     Race = other   
     (116.3) 
     Race = white  -59.4* 
     (50.2) 
     Has disabilities that limit work  -84.87 
     (50.0) 
   Housing:  rent  123.3* 
     (57.1) 
    Housing: live for free  476.7* 
     (103.5) 
    Year = 1999  -22.1 
     (233.3) 
   Constant  2240.9 
     (2620.6) 















* Statistically significant at 5 percent;  † significant at 10 percent. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Probit Estimates of Likelihood of Being Enrolled in the Food Stamp Program 
  
 
Sample: Female headed households 
with income <100 percent of poverty 
line  
Sample: Female headed households 















  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
Attitude  variables         
 Welfare encourages babies  -0.087*  -0.089*    -0.067  -0.070 
 (0.043)  (0.043)    (0.061)  (0.061) 
 -[0.009]  -[0.009]    -[0.005]  -[0.005] 
 Mothers should not work  -0.123*  -0.118*    -0.085  -0.080 
 (0.049)  (0.049)    (0.073)  (0.074) 
 -[0.013]  -[0.012]    -[0.006]  -[0.006] 
 Welfare helps people get on feet  0.070  0.075†   0.095  0.097 
 (0.045)  (0.045)    (0.066)  (0.065) 
 [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.007]  [0.007] 
 Single mothers are as effective  0.067  0.065    0.085  0.082 
 (0.052)  (0.052)    (0.070)  (0.069) 
 [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.006]  [0.006] 
 People who want children should marry  0.042  0.046    0.012  0.015 
 (0.047)  (0.047)    (0.072)  (0.072) 
 [0.004]  [0.005]    [0.001]  [0.001] 
 Working mothers are as good  -0.140*  -0.141*    -0.152† -0.145† 
 (0.061)  (0.061)    (0.088)  (0.088) 
 -[0.014]  -[0.014]    -[0.011]  -[0.010] 
 Welfare makes people work less  -0.146*  -0.150*    -0.180*  -0.185* 
 (0.044)  (0.044)    (0.068)  (0.068) 
 -[0.015]  -[0.015]    -[0.012]  -[0.013] 
Predicted Food Stamp benefit  0.440*  0.502*    0.461*  0.460* 
 (0.122)  (0.113)    (0.212)  (0.176) 
 [0.045]  [0.051]    [0.032]  [0.032] 
Family earnings per-capita   -0.174*  -0.159*    -0.139*  -0.126* 
 (0.037)  (0.036)    (0.106)  (0.104) 
 -[0.018]  -[0.016]    -[0.010]  -[0.009] 
Number of children  -0.122*  -0.149*    -0.068  -0.069 
 (0.058)  (0.056)    (0.113)  (0.097) 
 -[0.012]  -[0.015]    -[0.005]  -[0.005] 
Marital status (1 = married)  -0.135  -0.154    -0.519*  -0.535* 
 (0.110)  (0.111)    (0.169)  (0.170) 
 -[0.015]  -[0.017]    -[0.053]  -[0.055] 
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(Table 4 continued) 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
High school degree  0.033  -0.001    -0.001  -0.041 
 (0.086)  (0.086)    (0.129)  (0.126) 
 [0.003]  [0.000]    [0.000]  -[0.003] 
Some college education  0.175  0.104    0.122  0.050 
 (0.129)  (0.128)    (0.208)  (0.204) 
 [0.016]  [0.010]    [0.008]  [0.003] 
With a college degree  0.343  0.329    0.333  0.296 
 (0.255)  (0.256)    (0.477)  (0.475) 
 [0.027]  [0.026]    [0.017]  [0.016] 
State per-capita GSP ($ thousands)  -0.023  -0.025    -0.014  -0.011 
 (0.025)  (0.025)    (0.040)  (0.039) 
 -[0.002]  -[0.002]    -[0.001]  -[0.001] 
State unemployment rate  0.030  0.029    0.023  0.024 
 (0.046)  (0.045)    (0.075)  (0.075) 
 [0.003]  [0.003]    [0.002]  [0.002] 
Midwest -0.136  -0.129    -0.354  -0.346 
 (0.165)  (0.165)    (0.261)  (0.261) 
 -[0.015]  -[0.014]    -[0.030]  -[0.029] 
South -0.271  -0.292    -0.200  -0.194 
 (0.184)  (0.184)    (0.286)  (0.279) 
 -[0.030]  -[0.032]    -[0.015]  -[0.014] 
West -0.152  -0.149    -0.118  -0.120 
 (0.134)  (0.135)    (0.219)  (0.221) 
 -[0.017]  -[0.016]    -[0.009]  -[0.009] 
Year (1999=1)  -0.023  -0.020    0.036  0.029 
 (0.047)  (0.047)    (0.075)  (0.075) 
 -[0.002]  -[0.002]    [0.003]  [0.002] 
Constant 4.571  4.295    -1.563  -0.914 
   (4.432)  (4.437)     (7.164)  (7.111) 
Pseudo-R2 0.113  0.117    0.096  0.098 
Attitude variables (Chi-2)  8.63*  8.28*    2.93† 2.84† 
N 2,933        1,529   
* Statistically significant at 5 percent;  † significant at 10 percent. 
(a) Respondents choose from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 4 ("strongly agree"), so higher values correspond to greater agreement 
with the statement. 
Standard errors in parentheses () and marginal effects in square brackets []. 
 